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Abstract of

THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND AN INTERNATIONAL SEABED REGIME
Progress is steadily increasing toward developing the
natural resources of the seabed as technological advances
create both the ability and, demand for their exploitation.
Concomitantly, reliance of the United States upon its naval
forces for national security is increasing the development
and use of sea based weapons systems for the future.

These

expanding uses of the ocean are creating the need for a new,
world wide system- of order to avoid the inevltable clash of
conflicting interests in the sea, both commercial and military.
With the advent of an international regime concerned with the
resources of the seabed now becoming discernable, this paper
examines 'the form which such a regime seems to be taking along
with its impact upon naval operations.

Although this evolving

change to the traditional law of the sea will influence naval
planning, it is not viewed as an intolerable incumbrance and
it is to the Navy's advantage to actively participate in the
regime's formation and operation.

Recommendations are made

relative to the policing activities requisite for the regime
in order to eliminate the tendency for tasking naval units for
such uses.

ii

PREFACE
The purpose of this paper is to meet the joint requirements of the U.S. Naval War College and the Master of Marine
Affairs Program of the University of Rhode Island.
The paper proposes to briefly outline the Navy's general
role as one element of this nation's overall seapower.

The

expanding sources of conflicting interest in uses of the sea
are examined along with the barely visible form which debates
are presently giving toward the creation of an international
regime for the peaceful exploration and exploitation of the
natural resources of the seabed and its subsoil, located beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.

Naval adjustment

to the requirements expected to derive from new aspects of the
evolvtng changes to present law of the sea are analyzed and
recommendations are drawn in order to preclude naval involvement as a policing agency for such a regime.
It should be emphasized that developments in this particular field are of relatively recent emergence, primarily recognized only since the Law of the Sea conferences held at Geneva in 1958.

Despite this aspect there is a proliferation

of source materials regarding the increased emphasis upon sea
resource development, largely centering around legal theory
and commercial technological-scientific applications.

Only

limited discussion exists relating specifically to the interfaqe

iii

between the Navy and an internutional agency controlling the
seabed.

Coupled with this fact is the highly political nature

of achieving the difficult correllation between the theoretical
approach and the realities of the existing world which defy
clear definition.
The author has therefore taken the

libert~

of considerable

deductive reasoning, backing his conclusions where possible by
reference to the more recent writings of persons possessing
greater learned experience and academic polish than his own.
Grateful acknowledgement is accorded to_Professor Daniel
Wilkes of the University of Rhode Island for his patient counseling and helpful guidance in developing this paper.
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L
VY AND AN INfERNATIONAL SEABED REGIME
THE U. 5 • NA
CHAPT&R I
INTRODUCTION
What are the implications for the U. S. Navy of an international regime controlling the deep seabed?

Would such a

regime serve to restrict or enhance naval operations which
have traditionally taken place under the concept of freedom
of the seas?
a regime?

What benefits might accrue to the Navy from such

What role will the Navy have in respect to the re-

gime?
These questions are addressed in this study along with
an examination of what the present concepts for the international regime appear to be, based upon the proposals now under
consideration by United Nations officials.

Over the last two

years increasing impetus has been given toward establishing
the regime.

Indeed, the United States has now taken the po-

sition that all necessary steps for achieving world wide acceptance of the regime's make up and function should be completed by 1973.'
National Goals of the United States.

The world is dis-

cernably entering a new phase of development in this last third
of the twentieth century.

Bipolar relationships between East

and West which developed at mid-century have been supplanted
by the political impact of newly emerged nations comprising
1

the "Third World".

Despite increased capabilities in air trans-

portation, the seas still remain the primary mode of moving
trade between most nations.

Technological advances are open-

ing new undersea frontiers previously not expected, as resources
become attainable from the ocean depths.

Therefore, seapower

will assume even greater significance than it

~as

in the past.

As an integral part of this nation's seapower, its naval strength
and the lattitude to employ it -- will serve to enable the
United States to continue a leading role in the future.
In developing an analysis of the

Navy'~

role and how an

evolving regime for controlling the deep seabed may affect future naval strategy, it is necessary first to determine what
the national goals of our nation will be.

For the United States,

determination of national goals tends to be somewhat illusory
in that for a government such as ours, policy must encompass
a concensus derived from a broad section of highly diverse public will which itself is constantly changing in attitude and
interest.

This problem of changing will has been dramatically

emphasized by the reactions of the American people over the
past few years toward the military involvement in South East
Asia.
For the 1970's and beyond, however, the clearest pattern
upon which we can base a blue print of U.S. national policy
is the "Nixon_
Doctrine",
. first mentioned in JUly 1969 during
a news conference at Guam and later more fUlly articulated in
2

the President's report to Congress on February 18, 1970.

2

Without delving deeply into all the facets of that report,
it should suffice to note that the present leaders of the
nation are attempting to plot less a role of dominance as
one of partnership in concert with other nations and on a
more co-equal basis than in the past.

This is particularly

so in the military sphere, for as President Nixon stated:
"Its central thesis is that the United States will
participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but that America cannot -- and
will not -- conceive all plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions and undertake
the defense-of the free nations of th~-world."3all
Over and over again his report emphasizes the future role to
be one of sharing responsibility and placing the importance
of self-help by the nations of the world themselves toward
shaping their own destinies and defense, without American
manpower.
The Navy's Role.

At the same time, the Nixon Doctrine

places increased emphasis upon maintaining a viable defense
system of our own.

Although the President singles out no par-

ticular mode of this strength, the lessons of history clearly
dictate that sea forces of the U. S. Navy must play an important part.

4

For in the event of hostilities, the Navy must

have the " ••• ability to maintain by force an even, uninterrupted trade over the seas and to deny that ability to the
enemy. ,,5
While implementing its role of partnership, the United

3

States cannot avoid the fact of its leading position among the
free world nations by virtue of its advanced state of resources
and industrial-Military-economic capabilities.

While seeking

to be a partner we will necessarily be a dominant one and this
factor will demand utmost talents for the implementors to overcome the tragic mistakes of the past
which led -to accusations
of "imperialism" when Quixotic motives of assistance were actually our goals.

For example, although the United States has

never sought to be a colonial power, the aftermath of World
War II has placed us in the position of res~~nsibility for administering the last remaining Trust Territories in the Pacific
Ocean.

Particularly in the emerging nations of the Third

World, American economic ties aimed at their development are
frequently denounced as imperialistic.

Despite our good in-

tentions, our actions have in fact frequently lent inaqvertant
credence to such criticism through our insistence to pursue
programs which the people were not yet ready to accept, whether
they wanted them or not.

Attempts to plant democracy in South-

east Asia exemplify perhaps the most flagrant mistakes of this
kind.
One factor Which assistance through partnership will entail is a lessening of military involvement through standing
armies and air forces on foreign s011s.

Already we are wit-

nessing the relinquishment of overseas bases.
-

-

Increasing

thought is being directed toward withdrawal of U. S. nuclear

weaponry from the peripheries of

Soviet Russia and Communist

fears of a pre-emptive strike
China in order to mitigate their
by the United States.
Solid planning is evident for the reduction of bases and forces in the Far East such as Vietnam,
discussions of future NATO
Japan, Korea and Okinawa as well as
6
force reductions in Europe.
With this retrenchment, dependence of the nation will increase upon its seapower to ensure programs vital to its interests are not thwarted.?

As Professor W. T. Burke recently

phrased it:
" ••• states have continually resorted to the sea
in many ways for promoting power objectives.
Traditionally, the movement of ships, military
and private, has been the chief form of exploiting the sea for power purposes, and states
have engaged in frequent power struggles to pre... ·:-'
serve or acquire conteol over the ocean or stra-tegic parts of it ••• "
Those who understand the insights provided by Alfred Thayer
Mahan more than three generations ago will find his teachings
regarding the seas -- and those who control them -- will have
continuing relevance upon the future importance of the navies
of the world. 9

Although Mahan was writing in an entirely dif-

ferent era of ships, weapons and world political environment,
the basic premises upon which he demonstrated a nation's dependence upon the seas are

DO

less important today.

It is

already recognized that Russia is following Mahan's precepts
on the influence of sea-power through its expanding maritime
and naval strength. 10

It should be clear that the United States must and will
place continued emphasis

u~on

maintaining its own naval strength.

The nuclear deterrent "triad" involving polaris and Poseidon
submarines deployed ocean wide to bolster the land based strategic missile and aircraft nuclear delivery systems of the nation are commonly acce~ted by most Americans as essential to
the national interest.

Integrally tied to this triad are the

conventional naval forces involving aircraft carriers and surface combatants as well as submarines which can assure the
maintenance of open commercial sea lanes

th~~ughout the

11

world.

To be sure, the modern navy is no longer limited to its previous role of ocean oriented usefulness since sea based air and
missile power now is capable of extending deep into any land
mass on earth. 12
Naval forces are uniquely fitted to augment the overall
seapower of the nation due to the physical properties of the
three-dimensional environment in which they operate.

Mobility

is one of the most important factors and closely related to
this is the element of concealment, particularly for submarine
forces.

However, these advantages acc~ue to a potential enemy

as well.

The submarine threat posed by the Russian Navy gen-

erates a most defi nite e h a 11 enge to protect our merchant and
naval fleets.

While the sea has or fered a protective buffer

to keep hostilities off our land i n the past, the advent of
missile-armed submarines' makes a bsolute control of the ocean

6

depths vitally important in the future.
The U. S. Navy, in addition to providing a strategic element of the deterrent triad, will seek to expand its defensive
capabilities to ensure the security of our shores from attack
by sea.

Improved surveillance systems will be required to

counter the Soviet undersea threat.

This in turn will entail

increased knowledge and use of the seabed as
tending information collection systems.

a

base for ex-

The "Man in the Sea"

program will encompass increased use of the seabed as supporting forces for more conventional naval operations move into
the ocean depths.

Eventual use of the sea for storage of mili-

tary supplies is equally as 11kely.13
An Expanding Frontier Under the Sea.

In recent years in-

creased knowledge and technology have permitted greater exploitation of the resources lying under the seas.

As one of the

most industrially advanced nations, the United States already
rece1ves large quantities of petroleum and other mineral products from the ocean depths.

At the present time offshore min-

eral production approaches five billion dollars annually in
value.

or

this most is from petroleum although iron ore, sul-

phur, beach sands, tin and other minerals are extensively

mined.1~

New potentials are continually being found for resources which
will compete with those on land for extraction and use.

Only

in an envtronment of world peace will the development of ocean
resources be possible.

7

It should therefore be clearly understood that the Nixon
Doctrine will encompass an increasing interest of this nation
in the sea and our capability of exerting a military presence
upon that sea.

It should be equally clear that the United

States will have a vital interest in any measures which involve
the exploitation and the control of such exploitation of

re~.·

sources in and under the sea.
While acknowledging that tactical employment of naval
weapons and forces will undergo constant and wide-ranging
changes in the near and distant future, it

~~

not the intent

here to examine what forms these changes will take.

Rather,

the intent is to point out that the sea plays a key role

af~

fecting whether the United States can achieve its national
goals under the Nixon Doctrine.

As such the strategic impor-

tance of its Navy's role cannot be overlooked.

At the same

time, while all nations seek to embrace the natural resources
of the sea -- the Navy has a vital interest in how any international controls may affect its operations on that sea.

8

CHAPTER II
THE NAVY, THE REGIME AND INTERACTIONS OF INTEREST
Interactions of interest will be increasingly evident as
man pushes further into using the sea, an area which has abounded with absolute freedom for so many centuries.
has freedom of the sea actually been totally free?

Yet,
There have

been many restrictions placed upon the so-called freedom of
the seas.

Some restrictions have grown from custom while others

have been created by edict mutually agreed ~pon by many sovereign states.

While the United States proclaims only a three

mile territorial sea, it has passed laws and regulations prohibiting foreign vessels from fishing in its "exclusive" fisheries area which extends to the twelve mile limit of the contiguous zone -- part of the high seas.

The Fisheries Conven-

tion of the North Pacific Ocean invokes the abstention principle whereby foreign fishermen agree not to take certain species
indigenous to American waters such as salmon, halibut and herring in specified areas of the high seas.'
The sum total, then, is that in the international law
sense, freedom itself has long been limited by certain constraints in order that its benefits may be assured for the
maximum good of everyone.

Thus we find such things as the In-

ternational R_ules of the Road which bind ships t o certain actions of navigation in ~rder tha t th ey -- and other ships

9

may travel in safety with at least a minimum danger of interference.

Even the sovereignty of nations over their own ter-

ritorial waters is not absolute in that the right of innocent
passage assures ships from other nations to transit through
them in pursuit of world commerce.
Increasing Interactions in the Sea.

As we enter an era

of technology which makes possible the access to vast resources
from the sea, what anyone nation may seek to accomplish is
more and more likely to impinge upon another nation.

Law mak-

ers, writers and thinkers are delving into ~ new and untried
arena upon which to base their logic.

The seabed, by providing

vast opportunities for overlapping interests which could breed
conflict, offers great challenge for developing the pattern of
new international rules and the forum which will have to implement them.
Since World War II the use of the ocean depths as a medium for nuclear deterrence by missile-armed submarines has
posed unlimited problems of interaction for the opposing super
powers.

How can a nation seek to assure its own self preser-

vation from possible obliteration through attack from under
the sea without going under the sea with opposing forces itself?

It is postulated that through the Soviet submarine re-

sponse to such a threat, the resulting interaction may well
be one of stabilization -- a factor which can only be judged
in the long view of history.2

So long as the use of such
10

forces does not come into play, this stabilization
judged as contributing to the maintenance of

~orld

~ill

seemingly only alternative to global destruction.

be

peace, the
Similarly,

as naval forces roam the surface of the seas -- and the skies
above them __ conflicting interactions will continually result
since obviously two fleets cannot operate in t~e same waters
without accommodation with each other.

So long as neither

side is bent on pushing tensions to the extreme, this too
could result in a stabilizing, standoff condition.
Commercial Enterprises.

A factor which is far more likely

to raise real conflicts of interaction arises from the commercial enterprises which will take place in the deep sea and the
various nations' attempts to accommodate their national security interests around such enterprises.

As commercial exploi-

tation moves from national jurisdiction into the international
arena, even the most orderly steps taken by these activities
will affect the operations of other entrepreneurs as well as
the purely military functions of the world's navies.
Seabed exploitation operations by their very nature will
necessitate use of the water column above.

This will serve

to limit the free use of these waters by surface and subsurface units not connected with such exploitation activities.
For instance, it is expected that construction of some form
of rigid, Phy:ical

appar~tus

at least of a temporary nature

will usually be required on the ocean bottom at the locus of
11

exploitation.

Above this will likely be a means of marking

the point, whether by rigid construction such as a tower, or
less rigid yet physically present as with a tethered buoy or
floating platform.

Even where rigid installations are not

required the means of conveying resources to the surface will
necessarily interact upon water column use whether it involves
an underwater elevator, cable, suction hose hoist, or a free
acting sUbmersible.
Accommodation of Interactions.

Just as naval forces will

need to seek accommodation around such

impe~fments

to sea nav-

igation, the entrepreneur himself will be concerned that his
rigs not be endangered from inadvertant damage or loss through
collision with other sea users.
An international regime is perhaps the only means of limiting such contradictory interactions without resort to force
which would in reality be total anarchy in the sea.

The his-

toric example of colonial development experienced from the
sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries emphasizes how conflicting
interests inevitably have led to war.

Even the more recent

development of America's western frontier witnessed the use of
force over the conflicting interests between such varied enterprises as sheep and cattle growers, land and railroad developers, to name but a few.

Only through the establishment of

a legitimate system of law and order can avoidance of force
be assured as conflicting interests converge.
12

Exchange of information at least as to location of operations would lessen the possibility of conflict.

Certainly

any international scheme of control would require prior notice
such as informaticn to other mariners alerting them to the
locality and extent of operations likely to affect others on
or under the sea.

Further, the elemer-ts of safety at sea might

be greatly enhanced through some stardard means becoming required for local, on-scene warning devices to alert other users
of the sea to hazards which may exist in the vicinity of exploitation enterprises.

Already a safety zone of

500 meters is

provided for such rigs,3 however no universal system of warning
has been established.
As to the implications involving U.S. naval operations
on and under the seas t there can be little doubt that as more
activities develop for the exploitation of natural resources
within the world's oceans, their impact will greatly affect
both tactical and strategic deployments of sea forces through
the inevitability of interaction of interests.

As these inter-

actions develop the national interest of the United States
will be to ensure their resolution through peaceful means if
at all possible.

For this reason the U.S. Navy must retain

an active role in formulating the nation's decision on what
form international controls should eventually take in order
to avoid as far as possible any potential conflicts between
commercial and naval activities in the depths of the sea.

13

For, according to William T. Burke:
" ••• the protection of comnon interest calls for
conti~ued appraisal and study, by all participants but particularly by the nation-state, of
the process of interaption, claim and decision
involving the ocean."'"

14

CHAPTER III
THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL REGIME

"An oceanic issue of primary importance before
the worlds' nations is that of the legal status
of the seabed and deep ocean floor."'
The prospects for creating an

interna~ion~l

seabed .regime

and the arguments in favor of it and in opposition to it are
beyond the intent of the present study.

The purpose here is

rather to examine what impact such a regime might hold for naval interests in the future.

For this it

m~y

be helpful to

outline the general form which the agency is taking, based upon current debate within the United Nations.
Recent Evolution.

It has only been in recent years that

consideration for controlling activities of the seabed began.
In December 1967 the United Nations established a legal working group entitled the "Ad Hoc Committee To Study The Peaceful

.

The Sea-Bed And The Ocean Floor Beyond The Limits or
National Jurisdiction." 2 Within this group, early agreement

Uses

or

was reached on the principal that the seabed beyond national
jurisdiction should not be SUbject to appropriation, but that
a distinction should be made allowing exploitation which would
not serve as a basis for claims of national sovereignty over
the seabed.
The following year, a more permanent committee of the
same name (Without "Ad Hoell in its title) was established by

1,

the General Assembly as a result of the Ad Hoc Committee's
work.

The new committee was assigned specific questions to

be examined relative to the establishment of machinery for
promoting cooperation in the exploration and exploitation of
seabed and subsoil resources.

So it has only been during the
st~died

years 1969 and 1970 that this committee has

the_myriad

problems of seeking agreement among its forty-two members.
Problems in Achievement.

In the committee's annual report

to the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly in October
1970, only very general principles are disc~rnable.3 Except
for acknowledging that something must be done, there is little
agreement upon what form should be pursued.

For instance there

is a basic question of the relationship between machinery and
a regime itself: some members of the committee hold that a regime would imply machinery as necessary to

I1

gi ve effect to the

principles and standards of the regime and regulate their principal apPlication. 114

Other members feel no machinery need be

implied -- that the principles of a regime once agreed upon
would then generate the form of such machinery.
Types of international machinery considered by the committee further exemplify the problems of finding agreement.
Four main types were studied in detail: one which calls merely
for exchange of information and preparation of studies; one
for registration and licensing; one possessing intermediate
powers; and one having comprehensive powers. 5 The latter is
16

perhaps the most practical from the standpoint of achieving
the aims of such a regime.
Another problem confusing the issue comes from the less
developed nations who express fear that the more technically
developed nations would dominate any controls envisaged for
a supranational authority.

This feeling pervades

theirap~'

proach toward solving the basic issues while at the same time
the more developed nations seek to ensure the less developed
nations will receive the benefit of revenues derived from

0-

cean resources.
To be sure, there is not even a clear definition yet upon
how far national jurisdiction is permitted upon the seabed.
Unlike the territorial waters which nations have arbitrarily
established as linear distances from their shores, the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf designated the limit
of national seabed control as extending to the 200 meter depth
which in many cases lies beyond the territorial waters and under the high seas.

However, the Convention went on to allow

for even greater depths which may become capable of exploitation.

This wording opened two additional problems which were

unforeseen at the time for determining an absolute boundary:
the questions of what constitutes exploitability and how far
from shore the principle of adjacency should extend.

Lacking

a clear definition to these two questions effectively thwarts
progress toward achieving delineaticn of where an international

17

regime would be empowered to act.

This aspect of the present

Law of the Sea also bears heavily upon any plans the Navy may
develop toward its use of the seabed as an operating base.
Acknowledging that arms control agreements will probably encompass the entire sea, some permitted forms of military uses
of the sea and its floor may differ significantly under the
evolving law depending upon whether they will be under national
or international jurisdiction.

Regarding military uses:

the recommended framework does not subject
military uses to any control or regulation;
they will be governed by existing principles
of international law and any arms control agreements that may be reached."6

n •••

Progress Toward Achievement.

In May 1970, the United states

offered a solution to the problems of exploitability and adjacency by calling upon all nations to renounce claims beyond the
200 meter depth. 7

This proposal has not received wide accept-

ance, especially from commercial interests in this country who
see this as potentially giving away enormous sources of revenue
from the continental shelves surrounding the United States.

8

Despite these problems which hover menacingly in the background there are broad areas in which some general principles
have permeated most of the discussions regarding a seabed regime from the beginning: avoidance of outright appropriation
of the seabed or its resources by any state or by any international body; avoidance of interference among and between the
various enterprises undertaken either upon or within the ocean
18

floors; prevention and control of pollution along with conservation of the sea's resources; and the assurance that benefits
derived from the seabed resources be shared in some manner with
all nations. especially developing or landlocked countries
lacking access or exploitation capabilities.
_ The United States' Proposal.

There were numerous draft

resolutions studied at the committee's August 1970 meeting on
what general principles should apply to the international regime.

However, the United States submitted a working paper in

the form of a draft treaty proposal which, though far from
overcoming the lack of agreement in many areas, provides perhaps the best general indication of what form a regime may eventually take.
~he

United States working paper encompasses the establish-

ment of an International Seabed Resource Authority.

Accompanying

this would be the creation of the International Seabed Area as
the
..... common heritage of all mankind ••• (consisting)
••• of the seabed and subsoil of the high seas seaward of the 200 meter isoba~h a~j~cent to the
coast of continents and islands."'!
A geographic transition zone would be provided by the International Trusteeship Area of some agreed upon width, seaward
from the 200 meter depth limits of national jurisdiction to
an outer boundary generally suggested as the break between
the continental slope and the continental margin.
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The basic

intent here would be to secure to the coastal power the right
to administer controls near its area of geographic interest
in behalf of the international regime.

Beyond the Trustee-

ship Area, the regime would assume management of controls.
Regime Status Under International Law.

One basic premise

of the U. S. proposal is that the establishment of the international authority should provide for a juridical personality,
that is it would have legal capacity, privilege and immunity
such as provided for the United Nations organization.

The au-

thority would have an active role engaged in_controlling seabed operations beyond national jurisdiction rather than merely
recording the activities of various exploitive undertakings.

As envisioned by the proposal this authority would consist of a General Assembly of delegates from all contracting
nations, a Council consisting of twenty-four designated or
elected delegates and a Tribunal to which disputes or advice
on interpretive measures could be referred.

The latter would

consist of internationally appointed jurists who would serve
the day-to-day functions of an international court relating
specifically to problems of the seabed regime.

Supportive

commissions would perform the technical functions specified
by the convention and be composed of appointed personnel with
"suitable qualifications and experience in seabed resources
management, ~aritime sa~ety, ocean and marine engineering,
••• mining and mineral technology ••• operation of marine instal-"
lations, equipment and devices ••• ,,10
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A Secretatiat ~ould be

formed on the model of the United Nations Organization.

The

authority could be a part of the U. N. or a completely separate
body.
Aims of the Regime.

The basic premise of the U. S. pro-

posal is that the International Seabed Resource Authority would
engage in licensing the exploration and exploitation enterprises
of a commercial nature which:
"have as their principal or ultimate purpose
the discovery or appraisal, and exploitation,
of mineral deposits ••• " 11
Further, provision is made for exploiting ltving resources of
the seabed in accordance with conservation measures; creation
of protective rules against pollution; the promotion of scientific

rese~rch;

and the designation of specific areas as marine

parks and preserves having "unusual educational, scientific or
recre~tional value. 1I 12
It is readily apparent from the wording of the working
paper that purely military ventures would come exclusively outside the jurisdiction of such an authority, although it is
pointed out that arms agreements such as the emplacement of
strategic weapons of mass destruction would COme under the purview of arms control limitations separate from but certainly
of interest to the regime.
If the Navy were to engage in commercial or non-defense
oriented activities on the ocean floor, there is every reason
to believe it would follow the same licensing procedures as
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any other such enterprise.

Here again, the basic aim of the

United States should be interpreted as allowing for military
uses of the seabed.

These uses would not be sUbject to the

regime's jurisdiction so long as they relate to defensive or
scientific purposes which will promote world peace.
In view of historic events since World War II and the
evolution of the "Cold War" despite the creation of the United
Nations, it seems likely that only if defensive military uses
of the sea and ocean floor are permitted will political realities in the family of nations ever allow creation of an international regime.
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CHAPTER IV
NAVAL ADJUSTMENT TO THE REGIME

Nowhere else on earth does there seem to be a greater
need for clear definition and outline to resolve conflicting
interactions of interest than under the high seas.

In at-

tempting to accommodate the traditional, yet already limited
freedom of the seas concept, some further infringement upon
this freedom seems virtually inevitable in the expanding exploration and exploitation of the underlying seabed.

If this

were merely to involve an accommodation of business interests
alone, the issues might be capable of easy resolution through
knowledgeable lawyers and shrewd bargaining between commercial
representatives.

But in addition to vast mineral resources,

the potential means of assuring a nation's survival also lie
under the sea.
The development of nuclear powered submarine fleets armed
with weapons capable of incalculable destruction upon an enemy
has increased the importance of the sea in national security,
particularly for the major world powers.

It is therefore im-

perative that the U. S. Navy and other national planners proceed cautiously, examining in every detail the ramifications
an international seabed regime might hold relative to the defensive capabilities of this country.
The Sea as a Different Legal Environment.
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The seas and

their floors offer a far wider area for the conflicts of interaction than are found on land.

For example, on the land

areas of the world armies were once free to roam wherever their·
power permitted.

Under the nation-state concept and with the

evolution of laws in more modern times, the armies of the world
have become constrained to remain within thei~ own territorial
boundaries unless nations choose to wage aggression against
their neighbors.

This concept of territorial sovereignty and

integrity was even extended into the air overlying nations once
the impact of the aviation age came to be r~alized.
Not so, however, with the oceans which have been held free
at least in principle since Hugo Grotius outlined the concept
during the seventeenth century.

In the present day the fear

of nationalization of the world's oceans, or significant portions of them, is perhaps the most compelling force for seek-

I

ing agreement on controlling measures for exploiting ocean resources while keeping the seas themselves reasonably free.

The

trend in recent years has been for nations to expand the previously accepted three nautical mile limit of the territorial
sea.

Already more than forty nations adhere to the twelve mile

line and increasing numbers have extended their jurisdictions
out to 200 miles from their coastlines.'

Indications are clear

that others may well follow as the lure of seabed resources becomes ever greater.
On the other hand, as long as the seas are free and not

under the domain of any nation there exists the very real possibility for multiple and conflicting interactions.

Consider

such hypothetical factors as an aircraft sweeping its sonic
boom over

~

fishing vessel which has its nets deployed into

the sea along the ocean floor and in turn interfering with a
resource extraction operation on the seabed which is itself
in conflict with subsoil drilling and mining activities -- all
at one geographic point on the earth, involving men and equipments from many different nations!
The principle of "Res Comminus" under which the sea floor
belongs to all mankind and therefore not subject to anyone's
jurisdiction would certainly permit such conflicting interaction at sea.

By contrast, land sites have long permitted ap-

propriation, jurisdiction and therefore control which prevents
such overlapping interests involving resource development. 2
The counter principle of "Res NUllius" implies belonging
to no one and would therefore at least theoretically permit
establishment of sovereignty over the seas, a condition most
international statesmen are seeking to avoid.)

For, as many

writers on the sUbject agree, a land grab of the ocean floors
would not be in the best interests of mankind.

Yet as already

shown, some nations have begun to extend their sovereignty into what was previously the high seas.

Some writers point out

that even greater progression may extend to the midpoints of
the deep oceans themselves unless the principles of an international regime can be adopted.
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Should nations continue to

expand their territorial waters, it will create a very real
risk of conflicting interests between them which could lead
to war.
Naval Interest in the Sea.

It is axiomatic that the Navy's

interests in the sea are many and varied.

In general they stem

from the historic fact that where man goes in trade, his problems, and therefore his military, usually follow.

The sea, as

an avenue to world trade, has generated wide applications of
naval power stemming from the special physical properties of
the ocean.

These are today manifested in m9-bile based Strike

Air Warfare, Anti-Air Warfare, Anti-Submarine Warfare and ocean
surveillance enabling the projection of military power at specific localities as well as strategic deterrence offered by
both conventional and nuclear weapon systems. 4 These are all
seemingly obvious, yet relating these interests here to a context in which they could be relinquished in deference to international control would throw an awesome shadow over the tasks
of anyone planning future naval strategy.

To identify all of

the potential naval uses of the seas defies even the wildest
imagination.

However, of special concern to this study are

three general, yet principle duties of the Navy: to use the
sea as a base for attacks upon land; to transport men and materials by sea in support of wartime operations; and to deny
such capability to the enemy.'

The nuclear deterrence role

of the submarine fleet is included in the first, while nearly
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every other facet of naval strength will contribute to all
three.
It is difficult to determine a dividing point between
patently naval interests in the sea and those which are strictly
commercial in nature.

Much of the research and development

overlaps heavily between them.

The Navy,

whet~er opera~ing

a

single ship or mUltiple fleets will require the ability to roam
at will over, on and under the high seas.

The conventional

display and use of naval power can range to every conceivable
purpose from supporting military

operations_~n

land in remote

areas of the world to ensuring that American and Free World
ocean commerce remains unrestricted by any nation which might
otherwise choose to hinder it.
The expanding naval capability of the Soviets, particularly
in their submarine armaments, generates a strong potential challenge to our Navy.6

This threat is basically two fold~ it

could be employed to hazard sea commerce anywhere in the world
as well as to deliver a nuclear missile attack from under the
sea against the United States or one of its allies.
Countering this dangerous undersea naval threat is a
widely diversified system of weapons and devices employed under
the aegis of Anti-Submarine Warfare.

Quite naturally this ASW

capability encompasses ships and aircraft which roam the seas
and skies in search and tracking evolutions.
The Source of Naval-Regime Interaction.
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Potentially mOr8"

s1fnificantly affected by international controls over the seabed, however, would be the emplacement of remote sensing

de~

vices for the passive detection of submarine craft transiting
the ocean depths.

Many of these surveillance systems are clas-

sified and little can be said of them except that they genera1lr consist of acoustic listeners capable of

~etecting _ship's

noises and whose location on the seabed would most desirably
be kept secret from any potential enemy.7
It is mainly in this type of interaction that naval and
commercial factors could easily be

expected.~o

clash.

As more

resources are exploited from the ocean floor, chances increase
that drilling, mining or dredging operations will eventually
take place where such ASW detection networks have been placed.
By the same token, the installation of exploitation equipment
could serve to restrict waters through which surface and undersea vessels have been free to maneuver in the past.

These two

factors appear to be inevitable.
Impact Upon the Navy.

What then of the questions origi-

nally posed regarding the implications of possible restraints
an international seabed regime might hold for the U. S. Navy?
There seems little reason to believe that the Navy -- indeed
all the world's navies -- could not operate effectively in conjunction With such a regime so long as the regime remains concerned primarily with commercial uses of the seabed.

Neither

does it appear that commercial exploitation operations under .
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such a regime need have an overburdening effect that would
serve to alter the future value of naval strengths to fulfill
their nations' security interests.
On the contrary, such a regime could permit all navies a
far more orderly appraisal of existing and planned commercial
enterprises which might potentially hazard or interfere with
their own naval forces.

Certainly it would serve both national

as well as regime purposes to have naval representatives on the
regime's staff in order to be alerted to potentially interactive conflicts of interest.

Such a working.program need not

obviate a nation's reliance upon secret factors concerning its
own national security.

Also this does not imply that commer-

cial enterprises would be restricted from any area of possible
exploitation.

Where such activities might encompass an area

already in use, by for instance some passive-defensive device
placed on the ocean floor, immediate steps toward accommodation
could more readily be started.
The U. S. Navy has long been operating under international
constraints on the seas of the world.

U. S. naval operations

have consistently honored the territorial waters of other nations.

Similarly, the controls imposed upon aviation under the

International Civil Aviation Organization since 19448 have not
hindered the growth in importance of naval aviation as an extension of United States sea power.

The Navy has traditionally

accommodated to civilian economic interest as shown by its
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frequent adjustment of oceanic operation areas and outright
curtailment of maneuvers in deferrence to such enterprises as
9
fishing, oil exploitation, recreational activities, etc.
The implications of a regime for controlling the exploitation of the deep seabed offer little change to the Navy's
capability of national security operations in the future.

No

where in the proposed draft treaties, nor in the discussions
surrounding them, has there been an inference that covert military efforts of a defensive, peaceful nature would be curtailed.

10

Although some discussion toward tptal prohibition

of military use was contained in reports of the United Nations
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace from 1966 to 1969,
this aspect has received little focus in subsequent U. N. debate. 11 This is despite the inclusion by Dr. Pardo in the famous Malta proposal of 1967 to reserve the seabed "exclusively
for peaceful purposes in perpetuity.,,12
It is also recognized that the Soviets have introduced
proposals containing reference to prohibition of military uses
of the sea, however these have been largely propaganda in nature and have not received widespread consideration.

Indeed,

the U. S. Congress Foreign Relations Committee in discussing
a draft Treaty on Ocean Space during January 1969 specifically
provided for the continued operation of Polaris submarines and
defensive underwater detection systems. 13

It would appear that

the more likely forum for further study of strictly military
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limitations will come from the Eighteen Nation Disarmament
Conferences at Geneva and its related Strategic Arms Limitatien Talks at Helsinki and Vienna.

Meanwhile, the commercial

aspects of discussion by the U. N. Seabed Committee can proceed to create an environment conducive to promoting the exploitation of ocean bottom resources through the international
regime.
Judging from the political realities surrounding creation
of such a body, the main focus of the regime will apparently
be directed toward the orderly development and exploitation
of resources in the commercial sense for the benefit of mankind and only minimally indirectly affecting other uses of the
sea.

This aims mainly toward avoiding the "land grab ll prac-

tices such as were employed during the colonialization period
of the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries. 14 Closely tied to
this concept will be the means of taxing the exploitation enterprises for the benefit of developing nations.
Strategic implementation of naval forces or devices of a
defensive nature will in no way serve to counter the purposes
of such a regime.

It would seem therefore that the Navy has

much to gain from the creation of an international seabed regime.

Further, the orderly development of commercial exploi-

tation provided by such agreement would avoid the hazards of
power conflicts which might otherwise develop without such
control.
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An Interaction to Avoid.

Although it seems logical that

the navies of the world should be represented within the administrative organization of such a controlling body, it should
not be construed that naval forces would be used for the policing activities which might be required for inspection and
enforcement of its regulations.

Such a use of - naval vessels
would seriously impair their missions relative to defense of
their respective nations.

It can therefore be deduced that

all navies would be extremely reluctant to commit any of their
forces to the international regime for such_ftuties.
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CHAPTER V
AN ALTERNATIVE TO NAVAL INVOLVEMENT
In order to avoid the understandable opposition which
would arise from use of the world's navies as enforcement agents and as an alternative to their being expected to meet
such a requirement, the creation of an international ocean
force capable of policing the goals of a seabed regime seems
both desirable and entirely feasible.

Senator Claiborne Pell

brought forth such a concept in 1966 when

h~_proposed

an In-

ternational Sea Patrol for which the United States Coast Guard
would serve as the nucleus.

1

Later, in 1968 Senator Pell carried his idea further in
a draft treaty on "Principles Governing the Activities of
Statei in Exploration and Exploitation of Ocean Space."

Chang-

ing the name to Sea Guard, the draft called for the policing
agency to "maintain and enforce international compliance" with
the principles of the seabed treaty.2
The need for policing adherence by all enterprises to
international measures controlling exploitation of seabed resources is certainly beyond question.

Without the protection

such services would prOVide, there would be little purpose in
formUlating rules which could be undermined by unscrupulous
behavior or even inadvertent misadventure due to pOllution or
to extinction-of those resources.
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The basic premise for a

regime is to assure order rather than chaos on the ocean floors.
Creating Enforcement Measures.

The international ocean

policing activity should of course be multinational in nature.
It could, at least initially, be created from discarded naval
vessels, aircraft and other equipments from nations willing
to contribute them.

Or perhaps these equipments could be ap-

propriated through long term financing arrangements since it
is anticipated that the regime will become a self sufficient
activity through revenues obtained from the licensing of commercial ocean enterprises.
In view of the myriad other obstacles the regime would
have to overcome from the beginning, the former suggestion seems
preferable.

Certainly the more technologically advanced coun-

tries, who stand to be the most concerned with ocean exploitation, should take the lead in making the equipments available
since the success of the regime will most directly affect the
success of their undersea commercial development programs.

The

transfer of equipments might even be closely allied with future
disarmament measures.
Let us examine more closely how such a force could be
composed.

The international ocean force would not assume au-

thority to control the territorial waters of any nation nor
the International Trusteeship waters bordering them except as
requested by nations incapable of policing their own areas of
interest.

Economic Factors.

Since the force would be strictly of

a policing nature it need not be based upon heavy armaments,
but on capable, seaworthy vessels for patrolling the high seas
in order to monitor registered exploitive operations and to
detect violations of international agreements.

As such, the

force would be manned by individuals possessing a wide range
of talents drawn from the naval, merchant and even fishing
fleets of the world who no longer pursue careers in those fields
but still retain man's inexplicable desire to go down to the
sea.

Such a force would require uncommon

d~dication

and total

acceptance of the challenge to work for the benefit of all mankind in keeping the seas' resources from falling into ruin
such as has resulted so many times from the uncontrolled exploitation suffered in many regions of the world's land areas.
Regarding the costs, ships operated in a service such as
this certainly would not be as expensive as when they are maintaining the complicated armaments which apply to modern combat
naval forces.

In addition, the force could provide manifold

benefits to all countries through the job opportunities that
would be available for retiring seafarers as well as training
opportunities for the youth of all nations who might wish to
become men of the sea.

The trained and experienced manpower

reserve this would provide to the parent nations of these individuals might permit augmentation of their own naval, merchant or fishing fleets -if situations should arise that require
them.
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Feasibility Factors.

Man has traditionally been capable

of cooperation at sea and a force manned by mUltinational crews
should prove workable through the common bond of the sea.

For

instance, the world's merchant marines are freqently crewed by
sailors of varying nationalities.

Further, the United States

Navy proved the concept of a mUlti-national crew from the Navies
of seven NATO nations during the highly successful cruise of
USS Rickets from July 1964 to December 1965. 3
Modern technology of both Russia and the United States
provides numerous supporting methods which

~ould

assist in po-

licing the oceans without the international agency itself having to expend large amounts for an exclusive system of its own.
Internationally shared data from orbiting satellite collection
devices such as Nimbus, ESSA, ATB and TIROS should easily be
available to policing activities of the regime.

~

Computer de-

rived analysis from a wide variety of sources would permit the
agency to keep abreast of its entire area of interest.
The greatest benefit of all would be the assured status
of commercial investment which presently hangs in question for
developing enterprises in the ocean beyond the limits of clearly
defined national jurisdiction.

The orderly process of both ex-

ploration and exploitation would ensure a more reasonable return to the investors which in turn would enhance all aspects
of developing the resources of the ocean for the use of all
mankind.
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Potential for Future Expansion.

The international ocean

force need not necessarily be limited to monitoring seabed
exploitation activities alone.

Indeed, in view of the inevi-

tability of interactions arising within the sea, it is quite
conceivable that the regime itself could one day be closely
allied with the other various international

ag~ncies

and ac-

tivities concerned with ocean services such as fisheries,
weather observation and scientific exploration.

Appropriate

personnel working for the international community could be
stationed on the ships, aircraft and floating or land based
stations which could meet the requirements of policing objectives for all such organizations.
Other functional duties which could be assumed by the international force include an active role in search and rescue
activities presently performed by coastal states under provision of the Convention on the High Seas. 5 This service would
certainly be in keeping with the goal of using the ocean's resources for the benefit of all mankind.

The humanitarian prin-

ciples of the rescue activities of any state are now provided
to air and sea users of all nations.

Augmentation by the in-

ternational ocean force would be a reasonable extension of such
services and might relieve the burden for Some coastal states.
As postUlated earlier, creation of an international ocean
policing force would relieve the naval forces of the world from
an unwanted task which would interfere with their basic missions
3?

of national security.

At the same time it would offer one of

the most unique opportunities yet attempted for international
co-operation within the United Nations.

It would be fitting

that such an advance for mankind might stem from his operati9ns
on the ocean frontier.

For, although the expanding world pop-

ulations live on the land, roughly three quarters of the world
is made up of the sea -- and it 1s from the sea that mankind
may derive the greatest part of his future existence.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing has sought to show that in the foreseeable
future there will be a continuing need for a strong naval presenc~

on the high seas as an expression of

mination to remain a maritime power.

Unit~d

States .deter-

The U. S. Navy will have

an increasing role in implementing United States policy in
support of the Nixon Doctrine which calls for a lessening of
military posture tied to overseas bases.
The flexibility of response and mobility permitted through
naval forces will be in consonance with the "low profile" posture signalled by the new foreign policy for the last third
of the present century.

This policy recognizes the changes

in world political developments that have emerged from World
War II and the sUbsequent Cold War doctrines of the past two
and one-half decades.
The world, is becoming increasingly conscious of the value
to be derived from the ocean's resources.

Modern technology

is making possible the exploitation of tremendous riches from
the ocean depths.

As mankind moves to the deep ocean frontier,

conflicts of interest will result from the overlapping uses
of its surface, submarine and seabed properties.

To prevent

such cor-flicts becoming open war, international agreement is
desirable and necessary to permit the peaceful development of·
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natural resources for the benefit of all mankind.
In order to create order from impending chaos, the United
Nations is examining the framework of an international regime
for controlling the exploration and exploitation of natural
resources in the seabed and its subsoil beyond the limits of
nat~onal

jurisdiction.

At present these

limit~

require_clearer

definition before substantive agreement can be reached upon
the formation of the regime.

However, some important princi-

ples have been approved by most nations: there exists an area
of the seabed which must not be sUbject to

~ppropriation

by

any state and the benefits of its resources must be reserved
for all mankind.
Contrary to what the concept at first implies, establishment of an international seabed regime will not necessarily
impinge upon naval forces in their roles of safeguarding national security.

Rather than restricting naval operations of

the future, such a regime could enhance them by signalling potential areas of conflict with commercial enterprise, thereby
permitting early accommodation and adjustment.
Present planning for a regime is limited strictly to control of commercially oriented enterprises which would be licensed to find and develop resources under the sea.

Measures

designed to limit military uses will be the sUbject of separate arms control agreements.
A potential source of trouble for the Navy would be the .

natural tendency to task certain elements with the enforcement
duties which could be expected to evolve from an international
regime.

It is suggested that an independent ocean force be

established under the regime itself along with the free exchange of mUltiple data gathering services already in use and
yet to be devised by national and international agencies.

It

is further suggested that the regime could easily be expanded
to encompass other worldwide activities such as the enforcement of fishing regulations, weather collection and other environmental services as well as a role in the search and res'·
cue activities presently performed by coastal states throughout the world.
Manis involvement with man over the centuries on land
has drawn a history of almost continual war.

With his last

frontier opening to him under the sea, it is hoped that he
can now learn from the past and create a new road to future
prosperity based upon peace and cooperation whieh an international seabed regime could offer.
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Hands (Bureau of Naval Personnel, March 1966), pp. 0-9.
The mUlti-national crew experiment was conducted in USS
Claude V. Ricketts (DDG-5) from July 1964- to December 1965,
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Country
Officers
M
Greece
2
2
Italy
2
30
Netherlands
1
17
Turkey
1
10
United Kingdom
2
2~
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10
16~
West Germany
~
~
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4-.
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4-5
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ocean policing.
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